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Abstract: In a campaign spending contest framework, we investigate the potency of frequently cited 
sources of incumbency advantage in generating the observed patterns of campaign expenditure and re-
election rates. Since one Dollar of extra spending should not change a certain loser to a certain winner, 
we extend the literature by allowing the electoral benefit of visibility to be stochastic. The model provides 
an explanation of earlier empirical findings that district variation in the cost of visibility does not 
influence incumbents’ victory probability. Furthermore, in contrast to previous literature, the model 
predicts that campaign finance legislation can increase challengers’ expected payoffs.   
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
It is often suggested that the electoral playing field is tilted in favour of incumbents. Considerable empirical evidence indicates that officeholders enjoy 
sizeable electoral advantage when they run for re-election; incumbency advantage 
is typically estimated to be around 4 per cent vote share for low-level state offices 
and around 8 per cent vote share for federal and high-level state offices.1 The  
re-election rate in US House elections varies between 85 and 98 per cent. A number 
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1 See Hirano and Snyder (2009).
2 See Jacobson (1981); Milligan and Rekkas (2008). 
3 Palda (1992) shows that the larger the government wealth in control of the politician and the more power 
the politician has over the state budget, the more money the politician raises for his campaign. Hall and 
Wayman (1990) show that politicians with positions of power in congressional committees are better 
fundraisers. 
4 Glantz et al. (1976); Jacobson (1978; 1981; 1985; 1990); Welch (1981); Abramowitz (1988); Green and 
Krasno (1988; 1990); Erikson and Palfrey (1998); and Samuels (2001). 
5 The Center for Responsive Politics reports that on average, incumbents spend 35 per cent more than 
challengers. 
6 There are well-developed theoretical models of informative political campaign advertising, for instance 
see Potters et al. (1997); Austen-Smith (1987); Prat (2002a; 2002b); Coate (2004a; 2004b); Konrad (2004); 
and Soberman and Sadoulet (2007). Campaign spending can provide indirect information to voters about 
the valence of the candidate via signalling as in Potters et al. (1997) and Prat (2002a; 2002b). 
of sources of officeholder benefits have been proposed to explain these 
observations. Free media exposure an incumbent enjoys may give her a competitive 
edge.2 Incumbents also tend to benefit from greater fundraising efficiency since as 
officeholders they are in a position to deliver political favours to donors.3 
Officeholders and challengers may also be asymmetric in their effectiveness of 
campaign spending; they may have different technologies for converting campaign 
spending into votes.4 For instance, the incumbent’s use of official symbols in 
campaign material may help her to be perceived as more credible. We construct an 
electoral contest model of political campaign spending which includes these three 
potential sources of asymmetry between the incumbent and the challenger. The 
model is used to investigate which sources of officeholder benefits – greater 
fundraising efficiency, spending effectiveness or free media exposure – can generate 
the observed patterns of high re-election rates and greater campaign expenditure 
of incumbents.5 We then examine the effect of campaign finance legislation.  
This paper analyses political campaign competition in persuasive advertising. 
There is considerable evidence demonstrating that a significant portion of political 
advertising has little direct informational content. Abrajano and Morton (2004) find 
that about 70 per cent of the political advertisements in the 2000 US congressional 
elections did not involve substance. In Senate campaigns from 1988 to 1992, Kahn 
and Kenney (1999) report that only 36 per cent of political advertisements made 
an issue a major focus. Mueller and Stratmann (1994) argue that television 
advertising is primarily persuasive and that the growth of television advertising 
signifies the growth of the relative importance of persuasive campaigning. This 
paper will not enter the debate on whether the majority of campaign spending is 
persuasive or informative either directly or indirectly. But rather it takes the 
existence of persuasive advertising as given and focuses on its equilibrium 
implications.  
Two important aspects of political competition that are not addressed here are 
competition in policy/ideological space, and efforts to inform voters about candidate 
characteristics or policy position.6 Of course a full understanding of electoral 
competition would require both policy and non-policy competition. The goals here 
are more modest.  
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Our model is a reformulation of Meirowitz (2008). As in that paper we focus 
attention on the role of incumbency advantage and non-informative campaign 
spending by taking the incumbent and challenger as identical in all respects other 
than the identity of the officeholder. They are equidistant from the median voter in 
policy/ideological space.7 However the identity of the officeholder can lead to 
asymmetries in fundraising efficiency, spending effectiveness and access to free 
media exposure. Our departure from Meirowitz (2008) is the introduction of an 
alternative micro-structure which yields a stochastic outcome given candidate 
choices. Candidates simultaneously engage in campaign spending to enhance their 
visibilities to the voters. At the time candidates make their campaign decisions, they 
are uncertain about the extent to which voters will be influenced by their visibility. 
The model with stochastic marginal benefit to visibility is intuitively appealing 
since one Dollar of extra spending should not take a candidate from a certain loser 
to a certain winner as it would in Meirowitz (2008) and Pastine and Pastine (2012), 
where the outcome is deterministic given candidates’ campaign effort levels. The 
second main benefit of the modelling departure from Meirowitz (2008) is that we 
are able to disentangle the effects of fundraising efficiency and campaign spending 
effectiveness. In Meirowitz (2008) these asymmetries are represented by a single 
parameter which is the cost of an effective unit of spending. Since both types of 
differences between incumbents and challengers are observed empirically their 
relative importance in the understanding of incumbency advantage is of value.  
We show that the officeholder’s free media exposure is insufficient to explain 
the pattern of spending and re-election rates.8 In equilibrium the incumbent spends 
up to the point where the marginal benefit from visibility is equal to the marginal 
cost of visibility. Improved access to free media exposure does not alter this 
marginal calculation, hence does not affect the equilibrium choice of visibility nor 
the incumbent’s probability of victory. We also demonstrate that differences in 
campaign spending efficiency alone are not enough to explain the observed patterns 
in the data. The incumbent must have a lower cost of raising a nominal Dollar for 
spending. If candidates had the same cost of raising funds, then the incumbent 
would take advantage of the free media exposure and spend less than the challenger. 
Her higher efficiency of fundraising is what induces the incumbent to spend more 
in equilibrium. This is in line with empirical studies which strongly point toward 
incumbency advantages involving challengers’ difficulty in raising resources as the 
cause of incumbent’s electoral success in the US Congress.9  
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7Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009) and Herrera et al. (2008) model electoral competition where the 
candidates first choose policy platforms and then engage in campaign spending. Neither of these concentrate 
on incumbency advantage and the consequences of campaign finance reform. 
8 This complements Meirowitz (2008) which finds that voter preferences alone cannot explain these 
empirical observations. 
9 See Kazee (1983); Abramowitz (1991); Cox and Katz (1996); Levitt and Wolfram (1997); and Campbell 
(2002; 2003). 
An interesting empirical regularity which, to the best of our knowledge, has 
resisted theoretical explanation is generated as natural result of the model. There 
are vast differences in the cost of communicating with constituents in different 
congressional districts – Stratmann (2009) finds the cost of reaching 1 per cent of 
voters in the highest cost district is 100 times that in the lowest cost district. It seems 
reasonable to think that the electoral value of incumbents’ free media exposure and 
fundraising advantages would differ with such large variation in communication 
costs. But empirical differences in incumbency advantage between urban and rural 
districts are minor or non-existent. In the model, communication costs affect both 
candidates’ level of spending and the incumbent’s expected payoff but do not alter 
the re-election probability and would not affect estimates of incumbency advantage.  
The model can shed some light on the efficacy of some types of campaign 
finance regulation. While some regulations influence fundraising efficiency, for 
example tax deductibility of contributions, matching public funds, contribution 
limits and timing of reporting requirements, others such as limits on the 
electioneering communications window have an impact on spending effective -
ness.10 The qualitative predictions about the impact of campaign finance legislation 
on equilibrium probabilities of victory are consistent with previous work, but there 
are significant differences in the policy implications. When the electoral outcome 
is deterministic given the spending levels, as in Meirowitz (2008), campaign finance 
reforms that lower the cost of fundraising or increase the effectiveness of campaign 
spending do not improve the expected payoff to the challenger. Policies which at 
first glance favour challengers simply induce incumbents to campaign more 
aggressively and compete away any benefit the challenger might otherwise obtain 
from the policy. However in our framework, where candidates cannot perfectly 
predict voter behaviour, it is too costly for the incumbent to use her officeholder 
benefit to compete away all the challenger’s surplus. Hence challengers have a 
positive expected payoff from entering the competition. This is consistent with the 
observation that challengers often compete vigorously in primaries for the right to 
be their party’s standard bearer in the general election. They would not exert this 
effort if they had zero expected payoff in the general election. Furthermore, we 
show that with stochastic campaign effectiveness, campaign finance legislation can 
help to increase the expected payoff to the challenger. Therefore, a stochastic 
success specification is able to explain the contentious nature of campaign finance 
regulation. There are winners and losers. The model also suggests that there may 
be room for campaign finance legislation to help alleviate the entry deterrence effect 
of incumbency advantage.11  
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10 See the International IDEA political finance database for details of the campaign finance legislative tools 
employed by 180 countries. This paper does not study the effect of spending limits as a campaign finance 
policy tool. In 1976, the US Supreme Court deemed campaign spending limits to be unconstitutional 
(Buckley v. Valeo). There are however many democracies where spending limits are in place. See Pastine 
and Pastine (2012) for a model of incumbency advantage and campaign spending limits. 
11 For the significance of the scare-off of incumbency advantage, see Cox and Katz (1996); Levitt and 
Wolfram (1997); Uppal (2010); Redmond (2015); and Redmond (2017), among others.
Section II presents the framework. Section III derives the equilibrium and 
discusses which sources of incumbency advantage could drive the patterns in 
empirical observations. Section IV examines the efficacy of campaign finance 
legislation. Section V concludes.  
 
 
II  FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Candidates 
Two risk-neutral candidates indexed by i Î {1, 2} run for office. The officeholder 
is Candidate 1 and the challenger is Candidate 2. Candidates can increase their 
visibility through campaign spending ai Î [0, ¥). Each unit of visibility costs  
c > 0 Dollars. A candidate’s visibility to the electorate is given by:  
 
                                            g + ai/c    if i is the incumbent                                   vi = h                                                      .                           (1)                                               ai/c             if i is the challenger                                   
 
The incumbent enjoys a visibility advantage g ³ 0 due to the press attention 
she can generate as the officeholder without engaging in campaign spending. The 
value of winning the office is the same for each candidate and is normalised to one. 
In order to engage in campaign spending a candidate must raise the funds to do so 
which entails a utility cost of bi >  0 for each Dollar raised. The effort expended to 
raise funds is sunk whether the candidate wins or loses, hence a candidate’s payoff 
is given by:  
 
                                            1 + biai    if i wins                                   pi = h                                   .                                              (2)                                               – biai     if i loses  
 
Candidates may differ in their efficiency of raising funds; the lower bi the 
greater is candidate i’s efficiency of fundraising.  
 
2.2 Voters 
Each member of a continuum of voters casts her vote based on her initial disposition 
toward the candidates and her disposition which is induced by their visibilities. 
Voter k’s initial disposition for Candidate 1 over Candidate 2 is denoted by  
ak Î R. If ak > 0, voter k has an initial preference in favour of Candidate 1, and if 
ak < 0, she has an initial preference in favour of Candidate 2. If ak = 0, she is ex 
ante indifferent.  
As in Meirowitz (2008) and Pastine and Pastine (2012), voters are 
“impressionable” in the terminology of Grossman and Helpman (1996). Given their 
preferences they make their voting decisions rationally, however as discussed in the 
introduction, the mechanism through which spending is persuasive is left as a black 
box.  
                                  Incumbency Advantage in an Electoral Contest                                    423 
After observing both candidates’ visibilities, voter k’s utility is:  
 
                                            ak + f1v1    if Candidate 1 wins                                   pi = h                                                                                   (3)                                                 f1v2        if Candidate 2 wins  
 
The more familiar a voter is with the winning candidate, the higher the utility 
the voter derives from the election result.12 For each candidate the marginal benefit 
of visibility on voter perception is denoted by fi > 0.  
Voting for the candidate who yields the higher utility is a weakly dominant 
strategy for each voter, and we assume that voter k casts her vote for Candidate 1 if 
ak + f1v1 > f2v2, and for Candidate 2 if ak + f1v1 < f2v2. In case of equality there 
is an even chance that Candidate 1 receives the vote.13  
Each voter’s initial disposition  is drawn independently from a p.d.f. g(ak) with 
the c.d.f. G(ak). The distribution of preferences across voters may favour either 
candidate. Here we are interested in the effect of incumbency advantage in the 
absence of any differences in character traits, ideology or demographic imbalances. 
Hence we assume that the median voter is initially not predisposed toward either 
candidate, G(0) = ½, and that such a median voter exists, g(0) > 0. Voters 
simultaneously cast their ballots and the winner is chosen by simple majority. The 
candidate who captures the vote of the median voter wins the election.  
 
2.3 Stochastic Marginal Benefit to Visibility 
The impact of visibility on voter utility, fi, is unknown at the time the candidates 
make their campaign spending decisions. For example, the big campaign rally could 
suffer from stormy weather; the jingle written for the campaign might become a 
big hit; the woman picked by the campaign as a metaphor for the middle-class 
American single mom might be adored by the public. It is common knowledge that 
both candidates’ fi are drawn independently from standard inverse exponential 
distributions with p.d.f.s:   
                                       0                                     for fi Î (–¥, 0]                      fi ~ hi(fi) = h                                               (4)                                              Lifi–2 exp {– Lifi–1}    for fi Î (0, ¥) 
 
and c.d.f.s:  
                                    0                           for fi Î (–¥, 0]                          Hi(fi) = h                                                 (5)                                           exp {– Lifi–1}     for fi Î (0, ¥) 
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12 There is evidence that campaigning enhances familiarity with the candidate and that familiarity impacts 
people’s voting decisions, see Stokes and Miller (1962) and Jacobson (2004). 
13 Restricting attention to weakly dominant strategies eliminates equilibria where a mass of voters vote 
against their preferred candidate simply because no single voter would alter the outcome by switching her 
vote. 
where Li = l > 0 if candidate i is the incumbent and Li = hl > 0 if candidate i is the 
challenger. The distribution with the higher Li first-order stochastically dominates 
the distribution with the lower Li, and hence the former is more likely to generate 
high realisations of fi and less likely to generate low realisations. So the parameter  
h represents the asymmetry in candidates’ campaign spending effectiveness 
distributions. If h <1 the incumbent is more likely to have higher spending 
effectiveness, and if h >1 the challenger is more likely to have higher spending 
effectiveness.  
 
2.4 Timing 
Candidates engage in simultaneous competition in campaign spending before the 
marginal benefit to visibility shocks are realised. After observing both candidates’ 
visibilities and after the realisations of the shocks, voters simultaneously cast their 
votes. Candidates and voters then receive payoffs based on the spending levels and 
the outcome of the election.  
 
 
III EQUILIBRIUM 
 
While visibility makes the candidate more desirable – note that fi > 0 with 
probability one, see (5) – the increase in voter utility is stochastic. Prior to the 
realisation of the shocks, the standard inverse exponential distribution of fi yields 
a contest success function with asymmetric-ratio form.  
 
Lemma 1. Prior to the realisation of the shocks to the marginal benefit  
of visibility (f1 and f2 ), Candidate 1’s probability of victory is given  
by q1 = v1/(v1+ hv2) and Candidate 2’s probability of victory is given by  
q2 = hv2/(v1+ hv2).  
 
Proof. The probability that Candidate 1 wins, q1, is given by:   
                                                       v1       
¥
           v1 q1 = P(f1v1 > f2v2) = P 1f2 < f1 ––2 = # H21z ––2 h1(z) dz                                                        v2       
0
            v2  
       ¥                         v1  
–1 
    = # exp 5– hl1z ––2 6 lz–2 exp {– lz–1}dz                                 v2    
        0 
       ¥                                    v1  
–1 
    = # lz–2 exp 5– l3h1z ––2 + z–14 6dz.                                        v2    
        0
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Using change of variable u = –lz–1,  
                 0                     v1 + hv2                                       v1                          v1 + hv2      0 q1 = # exp 5u 1z –––––––26 du = 1const + ––––––– exp 5u 1  –––––––262*       
–¥
                     v1                                        v1 + hv2                           v1            –¥  
             v1      = ––––––– . 
         v1 + hv2  
By construction q2 = 1 – q1.  ■  
The Lemma and its proof are direct applications of Jia (2008), Theorem 1 and 
Corollary 1, which give the stochastic derivation of the ratio form contest success 
function where performance is determined by effort and a multiplicative random 
shock.14  
Candidates can increase their probability of victory via improved visibility. The 
greater h, the higher is the effect of challenger spending on her probability of 
victory. Since the value of winning is normalised to one, candidate i’s expected 
payoff is her probability of victory minus her cost of spending. Candidates 1 and 2 
maximise their expected payoffs with respect to their spending levels, a1 and a2:   
                                                                         v1                                     max E(p1) = max 1––––––– – b1a12                                
(6)                                                  
a1                                    a1     v1 + hv2 
                                                                        hv2                                     max E(p2) = max 1––––––– – b2a22                                      
                                                 
a2                                    a2     v1 + hv2   
where v1 = g + a1/c and v2 = a2/c and subject to ai ³ 0 "i Î { 1, 2}. These result 
in the Kuhn-Tucker marginal and complementary slackness conditions:   
                                   ha2                         ––––––––––––– – b1 + W1 = 0    with c.s. W1a1 = 0                                                   (cg + a1 + ha2)
2 
 
                              h(cg + a1)                         ––––––––––––– – b2 + W2 = 0    with c.s. W2a2 = 0                    
(7)
 
                         (cg + a1 + ha2)
2 
  
where Wi denotes the Lagrange multiplier on candidate i’s non-negativity constraint. 
These yield the reaction functions: 
 
                                                           ha2  
1/2 
R1(a2) = max 50, 31–––2   – cg – ha246       b1  
                                                        cg + a1  
1/2     cg + a1 R2(a1) = max 50, 1––––––2   – ––––––6                          hb2                 h 
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14 While the model yields the above ratio form success function from micro-foundations, exogenously 
specified ratio-form Tullock (1980) -style contest success functions like this are widely used. Applications 
include advertising, tournaments within organisations, patent and other technology races, lobbying, 
litigation, wars, sports and other types of conflicts. For campaign competition models with Tullock-style 
success functions, see Baron (1994) and Skaperdas and Grofman (1995). Konrad (2009) provides an 
extensive survey of applications.
Proposition 1. The simultaneous move Nash Equilibrium is unique and is in 
pure strategies. Equilibrium spending levels are:  
 
1. If g Î [h/(cb2), ¥),  then a1* = a2* = 0; 
                                                                                                   cg  1/2     cg 
2. If g Î [hb2/[c(hb1 + b2)
2], h/(cb2)), then a1* = 0 and a2* = 1–––2    –  –– > 0;                                                                                                   hb2          h 
3. If g Î [0, hb2/[c(hb1 + b2)
2]), then: 
 
                                                     h        b2       
2  
                                          a1* = –– 1–––––––2 – cg > 0                                      
(8) 
                                                    b2   b2 + hb1 
 
                                                      1        hb1      
2  
                                           a2* = ––– 1–––––––2 > 0.                                                                                                     hb1   b2 + hb1 
 
Proof: See Appendix.  
In order to save on space, below we only discuss the empirically relevant case 
where the incumbent has non-zero spending, a1* > 0. The incumbent actively 
engages in a campaign spending competition when her visibility advantage is not 
too large, g Î [0, hb2/[c(hb1 + b2)
2]). From (8) and the implied contest success 
function in Lemma 1, it is straightforward to calculate equilibrium probabilities of 
victory, qi:   
                                    b2                                                                           hb1                        q1* = –––––––                 and                  q2*  = –––––––                (9)                                  b2 + hb1                                                   b2 + hb1  
and expected payoffs:  
 
                                 b2        
2
                                                                       hb1
      2 
            E(p1) = 1–––––––2  + b1cg      and             E(p2) = 1–––––––2 .          (10)                             b2 + hb1                                                        b2 + hb1  
The visibility advantage  increases the expected payoff of the incumbent by the 
disutility it would take to raise the money to generate that level of visibility through 
campaign spending. But candidates’ probabilities of victory are independent of g.15 
In equilibrium, each candidates’ expected marginal benefit of visibility is equal to 
its marginal cost. The degree of free media exposure the officeholder enjoys does 
not change these marginal relationships, and hence does not alter the candidates’ 
equilibrium choices of visibility. So if  g increases, the incumbent spends less while 
achieving the same level of visibility (see Equation (8)). The effect of an increase 
in incumbent visibility advantage on the probability of victory is fully absorbed by 
lower incumbent spending. This provides a theoretical explanation for the empirical 
finding of Ansolabehere et al. (2006); they find no evidence that incumbency 
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15 In the terminology of Erikson and Palfrey (2000),  g affects the pre-spending anticipated margin of victory. 
However, for medium g, in equilibrium it does not alter the victory probability.
advantage is higher in counties with in-state media markets than in counties with 
out-of-state media markets where the officeholder would receive less free access 
to media.16  
 
3.1 Incumbency Advantage 
The model is confronted with two observations about US elections: incumbents are 
more likely to win and they tend to spend more than challengers.  
 
Corollary 1. The incumbent’s visibility advantage alone is insufficient to match 
empirical patterns: If b1 = b2 and h = 1, then  
1. the incumbent does not have a higher probability of being elected than the 
challenger  
2. incumbent spending is not higher than challenger spending.  
 
Proof. Part 1, from (9), q1 = q2 = ½. Part 2, from (8) equilibrium spending 
                                         1                         1 
levels are given by  a1 = –– – cg and a2 = ––.   ■                                         4b                       4b 
 
When candidates are asymmetric in visibility advantage only, the incumbent 
exerts less effort than the challenger and candidates have an equal chance of victory. 
Both these predictions are inconsistent with empirical record in elections for the 
US Congress. This compliments the result in Meirowitz (2008) where there is no 
electoral uncertainty given spending levels which finds that a head start based on 
voter preferences alone cannot explain these empirical findings either. Hence with 
or without electoral uncertainty, a campaign spending contest must involve 
asymmetry in the candidates’ marginal spending decisions, i.e. in fundraising costs 
and campaign spending effectiveness.  
 
Corollary 2. The parameter space for which the model matches empirical 
patterns:  
1. The incumbent has higher spending than the challenger when 
                    h(b2 – b1       g Î 30, ––––––––––2. This is only possible if the challenger is less efficient                   c(b2 + hb1)2  
     at raising funds, b2 > b1.              
2. The probability that the incumbent wins is higher than 50 per cent if the 
     challenger has a higher cost of raising an effective unit of spending: 
      b2      b1       b2 
      ––– > ––– Û  –– > b1.      L2      L1       h 
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Proof. Part 1 is a straightforward application of (8) setting a1* > a2* which results 
in the requirement g < h(b2 – b1)/[c(b2 + hb1)
2]. This is stricter than the requirement 
for an interior solution in Proposition 1 of g < hb2/[c(hb1 + b2)
2] which is  
necessary for a1 > 0. Maintaining focus on interior solutions by requiring  
g < hb2/[c(hb1 + b2)
2], part 2 is a straightforward application of (9) setting  
q1* > q2* and noting that L2 = hL1.   ■ 
If g is very large, the incumbent can relax and choose low campaign spending, 
safe in the knowledge that her challenger will either struggle to catch up with her 
visibility advantage, or simply give up. So, the incumbent spends more than the 
challenger if and only if the incumbents’ visibility advantage is not too large. 
Moreover, for the model to yield higher incumbent spending despite her visibility 
advantage, the incumbent must have superior fundraising efficiency, b2 > b1. If 
candidates were equally efficient in fundraising, then the incumbent would exploit 
her free media exposure to spend less than the challenger.  
The incumbent’s probability of victory exceeds 50 per cent if and only if the 
challenger has a higher cost of raising an effective unit of spending. However, there 
is extensive empirical evidence demonstrating that challengers are more effective 
in turning campaign expenditure into votes.17 Incumbents are already known by 
the electorate, whereas challengers often need to campaign just to establish name 
recognition, providing an additional benefit to campaigning. This implies h >1. If 
so, the requirement in part 2 of Corollary 2 for higher victory probability for the 
incumbent (b2 > hb1) is stronger than the requirement of b2 > b1 in part 1. Hence 
Corollary 2 suggests that both empirical regularities are primarily driven by 
incumbents’ fundraising advantages, rather than by visibility advantages or 
asymmetries in spending effectiveness.  
 
3.2 Variation Across Districts 
While the model predicts that asymmetries between incumbents and challengers 
induce variation in the probability that incumbents are re-elected and in the expected 
value of entering the race for challengers, it suggests that there is much less scope 
for variation across districts to do so.  
For example, between congressional districts there are vast differences in the 
cost of communicating with constituents even though districts have the same 
number of constituents. Stratmann (2009) finds that the cost of reaching 1 per cent 
of voters with TV advertising during prime time in the 2000 election cycle ranged 
from $18 in Idaho’s 2nd district to $1,875 in New York City. Therefore, the value 
of fundraising to politicians is likely to vary across large and small media markets 
which may be associated with the degree of urbanisation and county size. Because 
of incumbents’ fundraising advantage, one might expect that this would translate 
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17 Among others see Glantz et al. (1976); Jacobson (1978; 1981; 1985; 1990; 2006); Welch (1981); 
Abramowitz (1988); and Green and Krasno (1988; 1990).
into significant differences in incumbency advantage across districts. But there is 
no such pronounced pattern – Ansolabehere et al. (2006) report that “differences 
[in urbanisation and county size]... have not been found to be linked to the size of 
the incumbency advantage”. The implications of the model are consistent with this 
observation. Variations in the cost of creating visibility across electoral districts are 
captured by the parameter c. The relevant c would be low in districts with smaller 
media markets. But since the variation is symmetric across candidates in the same 
district, it does not alter the effect of incumbency on probability of victory.  
 
Corollary 3. An increase in the cost of attaining an additional unit of visibility 
via campaign spending (c) does not change the candidates’ probability of victory. 
Nor does it change the challenger’s equilibrium level of spending or expected 
payoff. However, the spending of the incumbent declines and the expected payoff to 
the incumbent goes up.   
Proof. Straightforward examination of (8), (9), and (10) yield the results.   ■ 
 
In districts with a higher cost of reaching voters, the free media exposure that 
the officeholder is able to generate is of higher monetary value. This allows the 
incumbent to spend less than she would otherwise, giving her higher expected 
payoff. However, in equilibrium, the increase in the relative value of officeholder 
exposure and the reduced incumbent spending leaves the probability of victory 
unaltered.  
There may also be variations across districts or over time in the degree to which 
visibility influences voter perceptions of the candidate – perhaps due to increased 
cynicism or a populous which is subjected to more media messages and hence is 
more inclined to ignore them. These differences can be captured by the parameter 
l. Districts with cynical voters or voters who are saturated with media will have 
lower l. However, such variation in l will have the same impact on both candidates 
and hence will not affect spending levels, re-election probabilities or the payoffs of 
either candidate.  
 
 
IV  CAMPAIGN FINANCE LEGISLATION 
 
Policies that symmetrically increase the fundraising efficiency of both candidates 
– such as allowing political contributions to be tax deductible or increasing 
contribution limits – hurt the incumbent but do not influence the challenger’s 
expected payoff.18 When bi’s symmetrically decline for both candidates, their 
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18 The effect of a regulation that symmetrically increases fundraising efficiency can be analysed by 
examining (10) for the expected payoffs and (9) for the probabilities of victory and scaling b1 and b2 down 
by a common factor t Î (0, 1).
spending levels increase, leaving the probabilities of victory unaltered. The expected 
payoff to the incumbent decreases because the utility cost of the effort that it would 
take to raise the money to buy her visibility advantage declines. Overcoming the 
visibility advantage through campaign spending becomes easier for the challenger, 
but the effect of this on the expected payoff of the challenger is neutralised by 
increased incumbent spending. Likewise, any regulation that reduces the 
effectiveness of campaign spending (such as stricter restrictions on the timetable 
of electioneering communications) in a symmetric manner across candidates cannot 
mitigate the effects of incumbency advantage.19 Meirowitz (2008) reaches the same 
conclusion when candidates face no uncertainty about voter behaviour. Furthermore 
Meirowitz (2008) shows that asymmetric reforms that lead to a decline in the 
relative fundraising efficiency and/or campaign effectiveness of the incumbent  
have no effect on the expected payoff of the challenger. In the face of such reforms, 
incumbents campaign more aggressively and compete away any benefit to expected 
payoff the challenger would otherwise obtain from the policy reform.  
However, the debate on political campaign finance reform is revived repeatedly 
prior to each election because reforms are contentious in their very nature. 
Consistent with this observation, we find that reforms with asymmetric effects on 
the incumbent and challenger can increase the expected payoff to the challenger 
when candidates cannot perfectly predict voter behaviour at the time they are 
making their campaigning decisions. Since the incumbent is uncertain about the 
influence of her campaign effort on voter utility she chooses not to compete away 
all of the challenger’s expected surplus from the electoral contest. Therefore, the 
possibility of mitigating the negative effects of incumbency advantage is not so 
bleak.  
 
Corollary 4. An increase in the incumbent’s relative cost of fundraising or a 
reduction in her relative campaign spending effectiveness yields higher expected 
payoff to the challenger.   
Proof. By straightforward examination of (9) and E(p2) in (10). Asymmetric 
changes in candidates’ cost of fundraising involve altering either b1 or b2. 
Asymmetric changes in the candidates’ distributions of the effectiveness of 
spending involve altering h.  
Legislation such as restricting the use of staff in the incumbent’s office for 
campaigning purposes, banning donors from contributing to the incumbent when 
they have a clear interest in an issue being discussed in a committee where the 
incumbent has voting power, and disallowing the use of official incumbency 
symbols in campaign advertisement, asymmetrically influence candidates’ 
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19 The impact of a regulation that symmetrically alters effectiveness of visibility can be captured by changes 
to the parameter l, recall that Li = l > 0 if candidate i is the incumbent and Li = hl > 0 if candidate i is the 
challenger. Changes to l are neutral on spending levels, on victory probabilities and on expected payoffs.
fundraising efficiency and campaigning effectiveness. These sorts of regulations 
can help level the playing field, and improve the chances of victory for the 
challenger as well as her expected payoff.  
The literature on incumbency advantage identifies the scare-off effect of direct 
officeholder benefits as one of the major sources of the high incumbent re-election 
rates. The tendency for incumbency to deter the entry of high-quality opponents is 
documented by Cox and Katz (1996) and Levitt and Wolfram (1997). Potential high-
quality challengers are likely to have high opportunity cost. When the expected 
payoff from entering the electoral race is smaller than what they could have outside 
of politics, they choose not to run. Campaign finance reform that augments the 
expected payoff to the challenger may help attract higher quality challengers, 
mitigating this deterrence effect.  
 
 
V  CONCLUSION 
 
This paper develops a version of the Meirowitz (2008) electoral contest model of 
persuasive campaigning. The significant new feature of the model is that at the time 
that the candidates are deciding on their campaign expenditures they are not certain 
how persuasive these expenditures will be; they are uncertain about how voters will 
react to their campaign. This implies that one Dollar of extra spending will not 
change a candidate from a certain loser to a certain winner, even given her rival’s 
spending. It also permits us to disentangle the effects of fundraising efficiency and 
campaign spending effectiveness. We find that officeholder visibility advantage is 
insufficient to explain the empirically observed pattern of spending and incumbent 
re-election rates in US congressional elections. Incumbents’ superior fundraising 
efficiency is the key to matching these empirical patterns. The model is an 
abstraction from various important elements of competition in politics, such as 
ideological positioning, contests over policy favours, candidate character trait 
differences and partisanship. Hence policy recommendations based on the findings 
must be tentative. Nevertheless, the model is able to capture the contentious nature 
of campaign finance regulation. There is indication that campaign finance reforms 
that increase the relative efficiency of fundraising and/or campaign effectiveness 
of the challenger may succeed in increasing his expected payoff, and hence may 
mitigate the scare-off effect of incumbency advantage and attract higher-quality 
challengers.  
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APPENDIX: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 
 
For any given aj player i’s objective Function (6) is strictly concave in ai and 
decreasing for high enough ai. Hence for any, degenerate or non-degenerate, mixed 
strategy of j, i’s objective function is a convex combination of concave functions 
and so is concave. Hence for any strategy of j, player i will have a unique best 
response in ai Î [0, ¥), so equilibrium will only exist in pure strategies. The 
outcome a1 > 0 while a2 = 0 cannot be equilibrium strategies since Player 1 could 
win with certainty with a1 = 0.  
Examine the other possible corner solutions.  
 
Case 1: Setting a2 = 0 in R1(a2) implies a1 = 0, and therefore R2(a2) yields  
a2 = 0 only if g ³ hb2/c.  
                                                                                cg  1/2     cg 
Case 2: Setting a1 = 0 in R2(a1) implies a2 = 1–––2    – ––  is greater than                                                                                hb2          h 
zero when g < h/(cb2) and therefore R1(a2) = 0 if g ³ hb2/[c(hb1 + b2)
2]. Therefore 
corner solutions require g ³ hb2/[c(hb1 + b2)
2] and exist for this range of g.  
Examine possible interior solutions. If ai > 0 then Wi = 0 from complimentary 
slackness, so using (7) and rearranging the two players’ optimality conditions to 
                                                                b1 eliminate  (cg + a1 + ha2)
2 yields a2 = –– (cg + a1). Hence solving (7) under the                                                                 b2                                                                                           h         b2
         2 
assumption of an interior solution results in a1 = –– 1–––––––2 – cg and                                                                                          b2     b2 + hb1           1        hb2       2 a2 = ––– 1–––––––2  . The resulting a2 is clearly positive, as conjectured. But a1 is         hb1   b2 + hb1  
only positive if g < hb2/[c(hb1 + b2)
2] so an interior solution can only exist for that 
range of gamma, yielding case 3.  
If g < hb2/[c(hb1 + b2)
2] the single interior solution in Case 3 is the only 
equilibrium, if g Î [hb2/[c(hb1 + b2)
2), h/(cb2)) then interior solutions are not 
possible and only the corner solution in Case 2 forms an equilibrium, and if  
g Î [h/(cb2), ¥) then again interior solutions are not possible and only the corner 
solution in Case 1 forms an equilibrium. Hence the equilibrium is in pure strategies 
and is unique.    ■
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